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In the winning mood: Affect in the Iowa gambling task




The present research aimed to test the role of mood in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994). In the IGT,
participants can win or lose money by picking cards from four different decks. They have to learn by experience that
two decks are overall advantageous and two decks are overall disadvantageous. Previous studies have shown that at an
early stage in this card-game, players begin to display a tendency towards the advantageous decks. Subsequent research
suggested that at this stage, people base their decisions on conscious gut feelings (Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Based on
empirical evidence for the relation between mood and cognitive processing-styles, we expected and consistently found
that, compared to a negative mood state, reported and induced positive mood states increased this early tendency towards
advantageous decks. Our results provide support for the idea that a positive mood causes stronger reliance on affective
signals in decision-making than a negative mood.
Keywords: mood, decision-making, gut feelings, Iowa gambling task, intuition.
1 Introduction
Many of us are familiar with the phenomenon that we
feel that something is right or wrong, or that one choice
option is better than another, without necessarily being
able to explain where this “gut feeling” comes from or
what it is based on. When people make a decision, one
thing they can do is rely on such affective reactions to-
wards decision-options. Decision-makers can also base
their decision on a cognition-based, rule-governed and
precise analysis of the different options. This distinction
between decision-making based on feelings and decision-
making based on thorough deliberation is a prominent
distinction in psychology and decision-making research
(e.g., Betsch et al., 2003; Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008;
Hogarth, 2005; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, 2000; Wil-
son, 2002). The central question we ask here is whether
mood is a moderator of people’s reliance on feelings ver-
sus deliberation in decision-making. In line with others,
we define mood states as diffuse affective states that are
not linked to specific stimuli and that are relatively long-
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lasting (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Russell, 2003; see for dif-
ferences between mood and emotions Zeelenberg et al.,
2008). Based on empirical evidence for the relationship
between mood and information processing (see Clore et
al., 1994 for a review), we aim to explore whether peo-
ple in a positive mood state are more likely to base their
decisions on their gut feelings than people in a negative
mood state.
1.1 Affect in decision-making
Cognitive psychologists traditionally assumed that affec-
tive processes play only a small role in decision-making.
However, some recent findings suggest that affect can in
fact be important in decisions (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997;
Cohen & Blum, 2002; Kahneman, 2003; Wagar & Dixon,
2006; Zajonc, 1980; and see the framework of emotional
functions proposed by Pfister and Böhm, 2008). For ex-
ample, according to Damasio (1994), decision-processes
may be based on affective signals. Specifically, people
use somatic markers, that is emotion-based, physiolog-
ical signals. These signals are formed in situations in
which people repeatedly experience rewards or punish-
ments. Reliance on such affective reactions towards dif-
ferent response options may play a particularly important
role when decisions have to be made in an uncertain en-
vironment. In the present research we aim to investigate
when such affective signals guide behaviour in a labora-
tory task that models decision-making under uncertainty:
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
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In the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1997)
participants can win or lose money by picking cards from
four different decks, two overall advantageous and two
overall disadvantageous. Decks A and B, the bad decks,
involve relatively high immediate rewards with the turn-
ing of each card, but even higher losses with the turning
of some cards, resulting in an overall net loss for every
10 cards turned. Decks C and D are the good decks, with
the combinations of moderate rewards with the turning of
each card and relatively small losses with the turning of
some cards resulting in an overall net gain for every 10
cards turned. At an early stage in this card-game, after
experiencing the first big losses in the bad decks, play-
ers start to display a tendency towards the advantageous
decks. Research suggests that this tendency is guided by
affective signals (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997; Damasio,
1994; Wagar & Dixon, 2006).
Our focus here is on the influence of mood on reliance
on feelings in the IGT in this early stage of the game.
Based on recent work (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Maia &
McClelland, 2004; Wagar & Dixon, 2006), we define
such feelings in the IGT as conscious gut feelings about
which decks are good and which decks are bad. These
arise early in the game, after the first high losses in the
bad decks. Reliance on gut feelings can be contrasted to
reliance on more certain, quantitative knowledge, arrived
at through analytical thinking and detailed conscious pro-
cessing. We believe that, compared to a negative mood,
a positive mood causes people to rely more strongly on
their gut feelings in the IGT. This would result in bet-
ter performance early in the IGT in a positive mood than
in a negative mood, due to a stronger feeling-based ten-
dency towards the advantageous decks, when people are
still highly uncertain (Maia & McClelland, 2004; Wagar
& Dixon, 2006) about which strategy is right. We will
now explain our ideas in more detail.
Initially, researchers from the Iowa laboratory (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 1994; 1997; Damasio, 1994) claimed that
affective signals can operate not only consciously (as a
“gut feeling” about the goodness or badness of a given
response option), but also nonconsciously. However, ev-
idence for the role of unconsciously operating affective
signals in the Iowa gambling task has been reviewed
critically (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland,
2004). Dunn and colleagues (2006) argue that evidence
for a lack of conscious knowledge that players in the IGT
have about which decks are good and which decks are
bad is weak. People’s awareness about which decks are
good and which decks are bad probably arises earlier in
the game than other researchers previously claimed (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 1994; 1997; Damasio, 1994).
In the current paper, we are concerned with the con-
ditions related to people’s reliance on conscious gut feel-
ings in decision-making in the IGT. Maia and McClelland
(2004) identified three levels of awareness in the IGT (cf.
e.g., Dienes & Scott (2005), who made similar catego-
rizations of different levels of awareness; and see Price
and Norman, 2008). At Level 0, participants have no con-
scious knowledge at all about which decks are good and
which decks are bad and they do not have a preference
for the good decks. At Level 1, participants do show a
conscious preference, but do not appear to have explicit
knowledge about the basis for this preference. They are
not able to explain why they prefer certain decks and they
appear to base their behaviour on conscious gut feelings.
At Level 2, participants have gained knowledge about the
relative values involved in the decks and they can use this
knowledge to explain their preference for the good decks.
They have explicit, fully verbalizable knowledge of the
task itself, not just of their preferences. They have now
reached full awareness in the IGT. Maia and McClelland
(2004) provided evidence against the claim that affective
signals can guide behaviour unconsciously, when aware-
ness is still at Level 0. Based on this evidence, Dunn and
colleagues (2006) conclude that the claim that affective
signals can operate nonconsciously remains questionable
and requires stronger empirical support.
We were interested in the question whether mood
might moderate whether or not people would rely on gut
feelings (or Level 1 awareness), early in the IGT. Wagar
and Dixon (2006) provided evidence that consciously ac-
cessible affective reactions influence card selections early
in the IGT, prior to Level 2 awareness. That is, partici-
pants began to choose advantageously before they were
able to explain why. They formed affective signals, mea-
surable in the form of galvanic skin responses (GSRs) to
the different decks. They showed higher GSRs when they
were about to select a card from a bad deck than when
they went for a good deck. This difference in anticipatory
GSRs was correlated with a subsequent behavioural pref-
erence for the good decks (Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Bring-
ing together this evidence for affective guidance in the
IGT prior to Level 2 (or full) awareness with the evidence
against affective guidance when awareness is still at Level
0 (completely absent), we conclude that at an early stage
of the IGT, people base their responses on conscious gut
feelings towards the different decks of cards, that is Level
1 awareness.
1.2 Mood and gut feelings
The idea that people base their decisions on feelings
at an early stage of the IGT is completely in line with
previous research showing that judgments and decisions
can be driven by gut feelings (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc,
1993; Strick et al., in press; Wilson, 2002; Wilson et
al., 1993; Zajonc, 1980). Reliance on gut feelings in
decision-making may fluctuate. People can rely on their
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first affective reactions towards various decision options,
but they can also rely on a more careful, deliberative
decision-strategy. If individuals adopt an analytical pro-
cessing style, gut feelings are of less importance in guid-
ing decision-making (e.g., Wilson et al., 1993). We sug-
gest that the use of affect-based or deliberation-based
decision-strategies may be moderated by mood. Based
on empirical evidence for the relation between mood and
cognitive processing-styles, we expect that mood might
influence reliance on affective signals in the IGT, thereby
affecting the tendency towards the advantageous decks in
the early stage of the task.
Mood has consistently been found to influence the way
that people process information (e.g., Bless & Schwarz,
1999; Bolte et al., 2003; Fiedler, 1988; Hänze & Hesse,
1993; Isen, 1999; Isen & Means, 1983; Ruder & Bless,
2003; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; see Clore et al., 1994 for a
review; see Martin & Clore, 2001 for a discussion of the-
oretical accounts). A number of studies have shown that
in a happy mood, people rely more strongly on general
knowledge structures, such as stereotypes (Bodenhausen
et al., 1994) and scripts (Bless et al., 1996) than in a sad
mood. Moreover, in a sad mood, individuals are more
likely to deliberate than in a happy mood. For instance,
several studies showed a differential impact of argument
strength under different mood states (see e.g., Bless &
Schwarz, 1999 for a review).
Here, we focus on a different way in which mood can
influence judgment and decision-making. Our core idea
is that mood influences the reliance on feelings. Some of
our recent results are in line with this idea. In a study ma-
nipulating mood and affect-based versus cognition-based,
deliberative decision-strategies, we found that a positive
mood matched well with affect-based decision-making,
whereas a negative mood matched well with deliberative
decision-making (De Vries et al., in press). Based on our
idea that mood influences reliance on gut feelings, we ex-
pect that mood influences decision-making in the IGT.
We suggest that people in a happy mood tend to rely on
their feelings when they make decisions, which would en-
hance their performance in the IGT when awareness is at
Level 1, while people in a sad mood are more cautious
and rely on their feelings less.
1.3 The present research
The three studies reported in this paper aimed to test
whether mood moderates the tendency towards the ad-
vantageous decks in the early stage of the IGT, when
awareness appears to be at Level 1 (a preference for the
good decks, without explicit knowledge about the basis
for this preference) and affective signals apparently guide
decisions in this card-game (Wagar & Dixon, 2006). We
suggest that, compared to a negative mood, a positive
mood leads to stronger reliance on these affective pro-
cesses. Therefore, we hypothesized that, in the early
stage of the game, when awareness is at Level 1, peo-
ple in a positive mood will choose more cards from the
advantageous decks than people in a negative mood.
In order to test mood influences in the different stages
of the IGT, with awareness increasing from Level 0 (ab-
sent) through 1 (gut feelings) to 2 (full awareness, with
correct explanations), we focused on five subsequent
blocks of 20 card selections (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000;
Evans et al., 2005). In the first stage of the game (roughly
cards 1 to 20, Block 1), players sample the four decks.
Participants start playing the IGT with no knowledge or
experiences regarding the game at all. With awareness
still at Level 0 (absent), we did not expect an effect of
mood on choice behaviour in Block 1.
After participants have experienced the first losses in
the disadvantageous decks, players begin to display a
preference for choosing cards from the advantageous
decks, but show no signs of knowledge about the basis
for this preference, that is the values of the gains and
losses involved in the different decks of cards. Aware-
ness is at Level 1 and decisions appear to be based on
affective guidance (Bechara et al., 1997; Wagar & Dixon,
2006). Wagar and Dixon (2006) consistently showed that
around card 20 (the beginning of Block 2: cards 21–40),
participants began showing an affective preference, as
was shown by higher anticipatory GSRs towards the good
(versus the bad) decks. Moreover, this difference in an-
ticipatory GSRs was strongly correlated to a behavioural
preference for the good decks in terms of card selections
during those trials when awareness was still at Level 1
(gut feelings). In addition, participants were still highly
uncertain about the right strategy in the game during the
trials of Block 2 (Maia & McClelland, 2004; Wagar &
Dixon, 2006). We were interested in mood influences on
performance in this second stage of the game (Block 2),
when awareness appears to be at Level 1. Later in the
game, explicit, Level 2 awareness is acquired about the
relative values involved in the four decks of cards, en-
abling participants to explain their preference for the ad-
vantageous decks and increasing their certainty about the
right strategy to play the game (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997;
Wagar & Dixon, 2006).
Our main focus was on block 2 of the IGT. We hypoth-
esized that people in a positive mood would outperform
people in a negative mood in this second block. We did
not expect mood effects in any of the other blocks. To
test this hypothesis, we had participants play the IGT, af-
ter measuring (Study 1) or manipulating (Studies 2 and 3)
their mood. Because of our a priori prediction that mood
would be related to IGT performance in Block 2 and not
in any of the other blocks, we tested our prediction by
looking at this specific Block 2 correlation in Study 1 or
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contrast in Studies 2 and 3 (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985).
We also conducted additional analyses on the pooled data
of the three separate studies, which enabled us to test the
robustness of mood effects on performance in the IGT in
an overall analysis.
2 Study 1
2.1 Overview and predictions
In this first Study, we expected that naturally occurring
differences in mood would be related to performance in
Block 2 of the IGT, but not to performance in any of the
other blocks. We first measured mood. After a short filler
task, participants played the IGT.
2.2 Method
Participants. Fifty-three students from the Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen participated. They received three euros
for their participation of 30 minutes.
Procedure. The experimenters, who were blind for
condition and regarding the hypothesis under test, told
participants that they would work on two independent
studies. First, mood was assessed on a computerized 9-
point response scale, anchored with ‘not at all’ and ‘very
much’. This scale consisted of three items (Cronbach’s
alpha = .78) to measure positive affect: 1. To what extent
do you feel happy at the moment? 2. To what extent do
you feel positive at the moment? 3. To what extent do you
feel cheerful at the moment? Mood scores were obtained
by calculating the mean score for each participant on this
scale. After a short, unrelated filler task (drawing a map
of the campus), the gambling task (IGT) was introduced
to participants. We used the original, standard version of
the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994). Participants were given
a loan of C2000, - in play money, and had to draw cards
from four decks in front of them. Beforehand, the total
number of cards to be drawn (100) was unknown to the
participants. Each card would generate a profit and, un-
predictably, some cards would also generate a loss. The
participants’ task was to play in such a way that they
would win as much money as possible. Participants had
to learn by experience which strategy worked best. Play-
ing mostly from the disadvantageous decks would lead to
an overall loss (C250,- in every ten cards), whereas play-
ing mostly from the advantageous decks would lead to an
overall gain (C250,- in every ten cards).
Following a common way to score performance in the
IGT, we calculated scores for the performance of each
participant on the IGT for five consecutive blocks of 20
cards by subtracting the number of cards picked from the
bad decks from the number of cards picked from the good
decks (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000; Evans et al., 2005). The
higher a score, the more cards are drawn from the ad-
vantageous decks. The game lasted approximately 20
minutes. Finally, participants were paid, debriefed, and
thanked for participation.
2.3 Results and discussion
We calculated correlations between mood and the five
IGT block scores. In accordance with our prediction,
mood was found to be significantly related to perfor-
mance in the second stage of the game (block 2: cards
21–40), after experiencing the first losses in the disad-
vantageous decks, r(53) = .35, p < .011. As expected,
there were no significant correlations between mood and
performance in the other blocks (block 1: r(53) = -.08,
p < .61; block 3: r(53) = -.03, p < .85; block 4: r(53)
= -.20, p < .15, & block 5: r(53) = .04, p < .78). These
results support our ideas concerning the relation between
reliance on affective guidance and mood; the more pos-
itive their mood state, the more cards participants chose
from the advantageous decks. In Studies 2 and 3 we fur-
ther explored these ideas by experimentally manipulating
mood.
3 Study 2
3.1 Overview and predictions
In Study 2, we tested our prediction that mood would
influence performance in the IGT. Specifically, we pre-
dicted that a positive mood would result in better perfor-
mance in Block 2 of the IGT than a negative mood. We
did not expect mood effects in any of the other blocks.
To test our predictions, we first manipulated mood. Next,
participants played the IGT.
3.2 Method
Participants and design. Fifty-two students from the
Radboud University Nijmegen were randomly assigned
to a positive or negative mood condition. For a participa-
tion of 30 minutes they received 3 euros.
Mood manipulation. Participants watched a short
video clip (2.5 minutes) in order to induce either a posi-
tive or a negative mood state. In the positive mood con-
dition they watched a funny fragment (from the Mup-
pet Show), while in the negative mood condition they
watched a sad fragment (from Schindler’s List). These
film clips have previously been shown to induce the
mood state intended. After watching the positive mood
fragment, participants scored significantly higher on a 9
point-mood scale than after watching the negative mood
fragment (e.g., De Vries et al., in press).
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Figure 1: Gambling game performance as a function of
mood: Study 2.
Procedure. Participants were told that they would be
working on two different studies. They were given in-
structions for the “first study”, allegedly concerned with
the evaluation of film clips, and for the “second study”,
the gambling task. Then, the experimenter left the room
and participants watched the happy or sad video clip. The
experimenter, who was blind for condition and regard-
ing the hypothesis under test, subsequently re-entered the
room, and the gambling game immediately started. The
procedure of the gambling task was identical to Study 1.
Evaluation of the film clips took place at the end of the
experiment, after the IGT. Participants were asked sev-
eral questions about the film clip they had watched, such
as “How did you like the film clip you watched earlier in
this experiment?” When probed for suspicion, none of
the participants was able to identify the goal of this study.
3.3 Results and Discussion
We tested whether mood influenced choice behaviour in
the IGT. In Block 2, mood affected the number of cards
chosen from the good decks minus the number of cards
chosen from the bad decks. A t-test revealed that perfor-
mance in block 2 was better for participants in the pos-
itive mood condition (M = 6.17) than for participants in
the negative mood condition (M = 1.43), t(50) = 2.14, p
< .04, Cohen’s d = .61 (medium to large effect; Cohen,
1992), see Figure 1. Again, as expected, mood did not
affect performance in any of the other blocks, (ps > .36).
In block 2, players in the positive mood condition per-
formed significantly better than players in the negative
mood condition.
Study 2 also supported our hypothesis that mood af-
fects performance in the IGT, in the early stage of the
game. Compared to a negative mood state, a posi-
tive mood state enhanced the tendency towards choosing
cards from the advantageous decks. These results are in
line with our idea that compared to a negative mood state,
a positive mood state results in stronger reliance on feel-
ings in decision-making.
In Study 3, we aimed to replicate our findings with
the use of a computerized version of the IGT. One of the
strengths of the IGT is its robustness in face of changes in
the way it is administered, including whether it is admin-
istered manually or in a computerized form (Dunn et al.,
2006). Use of a computerized version instead of a face-
to-face version of the IGT would enable us to rule out any
possible unwanted influences of the experimenter on the
behaviour of participants.
4 Study 3
4.1 Overview and predictions
Again, we predicted that a positive mood would result in
better performance in Block 2 of the IGT than a negative
mood. We did not expect mood effects in any of the other
blocks. After a mood manipulation, participants played a
computerized version of the IGT.
4.2 Method
Participants and design. Thirty-two students from the
Radboud University Nijmegen were randomly assigned
to a positive or negative mood condition. As in the pre-
vious studies, they received 3 euros for a participation of
30 minutes.
Procedure. Study 3 only differed from Study 2 in the
use of a computerized version of the IGT instead of a
face-to-face version. Except for the way of administra-
tion, this version of the IGT was similar to the standard,
original version that we used in the previous studies. The
four decks of cards were represented on the computer
screen. To pick a card, participants could click on one
of those four decks. Information on how much money
they won by choosing this card would then appear in the
middle of the screen. If the card they chose also resulted
in a loss, information about how much money they lost
would subsequently appear in the middle of the screen.
During the game, a green bar in the top of the screen con-
stantly represented the total amount of money, which was
updated after every decision. After 100 card pickings, the
game automatically stopped. Finally, participants were
debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation. When
probed for suspicion, none of the participants was able to
identify the goal of this study.
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4.3 Results and discussion
We aimed to test whether the number of cards chosen
from the good decks minus the number of cards cho-
sen from the bad decks depended on mood state. Posi-
tive mood participants again outperformed negative mood
participants in block 2 (Ms = 3.55 vs. -1.71), t(30) = 2.30,
p < .03, Cohen’s d = .65 (medium to large effect; Cohen,
1992), see Figure 2. No significant effects of mood on
performance in blocks 1, 3 and 4 were obtained (ps >
.37). Performance in block 5 was better for participants
in the negative mood condition (M = 12.86) than for par-
ticipants in the positive mood condition (M = 5.77), t(30)
= 2.88, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .81 (large effect; Cohen,
1992). Since this result has not been obtained in the pre-
vious two studies, caution about its interpretation is war-
ranted. A possible explanation for this finding might be
that participants in a negative mood rely on analytical in-
formation processing, and therefore prefer to base their
decisions on explicit, Level 2 awareness, which has been
well established by the end of the game.
Study 3 further illustrates the robustness of the effect
of mood on decisions made in block 2 of the IGT. We
replicated this effect in this study in which a computer-
ized version of the IGT was used instead of a face-to-face
version. Again, players in a positive mood performed bet-
ter than players in a negative mood in the second stage of
the game. By using a computerized version of the IGT,
we could further standardize our procedure. While the
experimenters in Studies 1 and 2 were blind for condition
and regarding the hypothesis under test and therefore un-
likely to have had an unwanted influence on the results,
use of a computerized version further excludes possible
influences of the experimenter on the decisions made by
participants.
In block 2, players in the positive mood condition per-
formed significantly better than players in the negative
mood condition. In block 5, players in the negative mood
condition performed significantly better than players in
the positive mood condition.
5 Additional analyses
In accordance with our predictions, we consistently found
that mood was related to (Study 1), or influenced (Stud-
ies 2 and 3) performance in Block 2 of the IGT. These re-
sults are in line with our idea that a positive mood results
in stronger reliance on gut feelings in decision-making.
However, in Study 3, we also found that mood influenced
performance in Block 5 of the IGT. While this result was
not expected, it is in accordance with our general line
of reasoning on how mood influences reliance on feel-
ings and reliance on explanation-based knowledge. To be
better able to judge how to interpret the results found in
Figure 2: Gambling game performance as a function of
mood: Study 3.
the three separate studies, we decided to perform addi-
tional analyses. By pooling the data of the three separate
studies with relatively small numbers of participants, we
could conduct an overall analysis that would allow us to
draw stronger conclusions about how mood affects per-
formance in the IGT. Specifically, we aimed to test the
robustness of the mood effect in block 2 which we found
in all studies, and of the mood effect in block 5 that we
found only in Study 3.
The data of the three studies (N = 137) were pooled
and analyzed in the following way. First, a correlation
matrix for mood and the five IGT block scores was calcu-
lated for each study separately, with Study as a between
subject factor in the design. Since Mood had only two
possible scores in Studies 2 and 3 (i.e., negative or posi-
tive), pointbiserial correlations were calculated for mood
and each of the five IGT block scores in Studies 2 and 3.
Next, we conducted a multiple regression analysis on the
pooled within group correlations, with the five IGT block
scores as predictors and mood as the dependent variable.
This model significantly predicted mood scores, F(5,136)
= 3.34, p < .01, R² = .11, Adjusted R² = .08.
Confirming our main hypothesis, performance in
Block 2 was positively correlated with mood such that
the more positive the mood state of the participant, the
better the performance in this early stage of the IGT, Beta
= .34, t (131) = 3.89, p < .001. None of the other block
scores for performance in the IGT were significantly re-
lated to mood, see Table 1 for an overview of regression
weights and correlations in our overall multiple regres-
sion model. Our finding that the relation between choice
behaviour in the IGT and mood was significant only in
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Table 1: Regression weights and correlations for IGT per-
formance (Blocks 1–5) with mood in overall analysis on
pooled data from Studies 1–3.
Correlations
Predictor Beta t p Zero-order Partial
Block 1 −.07 −.85 .40 −.05 −.07
Block 2 .34 3.89 .00 .30 .32
Block 3 .00 .01 .99 .05 .00
Block 4 −.08 −.88 .38 −.04 −.08
Block 5 −.07 −.77 .44 −.05 −.07
the case of mood scores and block 2 implies that there is
an interaction between block and mood, which is driven
by block 2.1 We therefore conclude that mood only influ-
ences performance in block 2 of the IGT. Performance in
the other blocks does not seem to be affected by the mood
state that players are in.
6 General discussion
In three studies, we investigated the role of mood in the
Iowa Gambling Task and demonstrated that mood affects
performance on the IGT. We showed that naturally occur-
ring differences in mood states (Study 1) as well as exper-
imental manipulations of mood states (Studies 2 and 3),
influenced decisions about card selections in the IGT. We
consistently found that at an early stage of the IGT, after
experiencing the first losses in the bad decks, participants
in a happy mood state outperformed participants in a sad
mood state. An additional analysis on the pooled data
of the three reported studies confirmed that in block 2 of
the IGT, people in a happy mood state chose more cards
from the advantageous decks than people in a negative
mood state.
We interpret our findings in terms of mood influenc-
ing reliance on affective signals in decision-making. In
previous studies using the IGT, others (e.g., Bechara et
al., 1997; Wagar & Dixon, 2006) have shown that play-
ers may base their decisions on affective signals towards
decision alternatives during an early stage of the game,
that is before players are able to explain which alterna-
tives are best. We focused on one of the factors that
may facilitate or inhibit reliance on affective signals in
decision-making. We suggest that an individual’s mood
1The interaction between block and mood was also tested with re-
peated measures analyses of variance with mood as the between sub-
jects factor (Studies 2 and 3) or as a continuous factor (Study 1) and
block as the repeated measures factor. These analyses showed the same
statistically significant interaction between mood and block.
state functions as a moderator of the type of process that
guides decision-making. Specifically, in a happy mood
state, people probably rely more strongly on affective re-
actions toward different decision-options, whereas in a
sad mood state, people adopt a more careful, analytical
decision-strategy.
Our research advances on studies concerning the link
between mood and cognitive processing styles (e.g.,
Bless & Schwarz, 1999). We provide empirical evidence
for the influence of mood on behavioural responses in a
laboratory task that models decision-making under un-
certainty. Previous studies showed that, compared to a
negative mood state, a positive mood enhances reliance
on general knowledge structures. The present studies
suggest that, compared to a negative mood state, a pos-
itive mood state may increase reliance on affective cues
as well.
While our results show that a positive mood can lead
to better decisions than a negative mood, one should not
infer that this always holds true. Whether a positive mood
results in better decisions than a negative mood might
largely depend on the decision task at hand. Several
factors might play an important role here, and in future
research several hypotheses with regard to such factors
could be studied. For example, when faced with a de-
cision task that requires decision-makers to follow strict
rules in order to make good decisions, reliance on affec-
tive reactions might cause distractions from the optimal,
analytical strategy (e.g., Shiv et al., 2005; see also Dijk-
sterhuis et al., 2006). In such cases, a sad mood seems to
be more adaptive, because it may lead decision-makers to
rely on their deliberations.
On the other hand, thinking too much can sometimes
result in less optimal preferences and decisions and re-
duce satisfaction with decision-outcomes (Wilson et al.,
1993; Wilson, 2002). Sad decision-makers might some-
times suffer from overanalyzing reasons for their prefer-
ences, resulting in suboptimal decision-outcomes. An-
other factor that might be important is the complexity
of the task. Some recent findings suggest that thought-
ful deliberation is not necessarily the best strategy when
decision-tasks are complex in terms of the amount of
information involved (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Wilson,
2002). Finally, mood can influence the subjective quality
of decision-outcomes through its fit versus non-fit with
a decision-strategy, with a negative mood resulting in
a better subjective quality when a deliberative decision-
strategy is applied and a positive mood resulting in a
better subjective value when an affect-based, intuitive
decision-strategy is applied (De Vries et al., in press).
To conclude, we believe that the mood state of the
decision-maker can affect both the process and the qual-
ity of decisions, but that there is no “right mood” for
decision-making in general. Our studies showed that,
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in an early stage of the Iowa Gambling Task, a positive
mood is the winning mood.
References
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson,
S. W. (1994). Insensitivity tot future consequences fol-
lowing damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition,
50, 7–15.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R.
(1997). Deciding advantageously before knowing the
advantageous strategy. Science, 275, 1293–1295.
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A.
R. (1996). Failure to respond autonomically to antici-
pated future outcomes following damage to prefrontal
cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 215–225.
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (2000). Char-
acterization of the decision-making deficit of patients
with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions. Brain,
123, 2189–2202.
Betsch, T., Hoffmann, K., Hoffrage, U., & Plessner, H.
(2003). Intuition beyond recognition: When less fa-
miliar events are liked more. Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 50, 49–54.
Bless, H., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Sufficient and neces-
sary conditions in dual-process models: The case of
mood and information processing. In S. Chaiken & Y.
Trope (Eds.). Dual-process theories in social psychol-
ogy (pp. 423–440). New York: Guilford Press.
Bless, H., Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., Golisano, V., Rabe,
C., & Wölk, M. (1996). Mood and the use of scripts:
Does a happy mood really lead to mindlessness? Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 665–679.
Bodenhausen, G. V., Kramer, G. P., & Süsser, K. (1994).
Happiness and stereotypic thinking in social judgment.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 621–
632.
Bolte, A., Goschke, T., & Kuhl, J. (2003). Emotion and
intuition: Effects of positive and negative mood on im-
plicit judgments of semantic coherence. Psychological
Science, 14, 416–421.
Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1994). Af-
fective causes and consequences of social information
processing. In R. S. Wyer, & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Hand-
book of social cognition (2nd ed.; Vol. 1, pp. 323–418).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cohen, J. D., & Blum, K. I. (2002). Reward and Deci-
sion. Neuron, 36, 193–198.
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bul-
letin, 112, 155–159.
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, rea-
son, and the human brain. London: Macmillan.
De Vries, M., Holland, R. W., & Witteman, C. L. M. (in
press). Fitting decisions: Mood and intuitive versus
deliberative decision-strategies. Cognition and Emo-
tion.
Dienes, Z., & Scott, R. (2005). Measuring unconscious
knowledge: Distinguishing structural knowledge and
judgment knowledge. Psychological Research, 69,
338–351.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004): Think different: The merits
of unconscious thought in preference development in
decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87, 586–598.
Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Nordgren, L. F., & Van
Baaren, R. B. (2006). On making the right choice: The
deliberation-without-attention effect. Science, 311,
1005–1007.
Dunn, B. D., Dalgleish, T., & Lawrence, A. D. (2006).
The somatic marker hypothesis: A critical evaluation.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews, 30, 239–
271.
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and psy-
chodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49,
709–724.
Evans, C. Y., Bowman, C. H., & Turnbull, O. H. (2005).
Subjective Awareness on the Iowa gambling task: The
key role of emotional experience in schizophrenia.
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychol-
ogy, 27, 656–664.
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-Processing Accounts of
Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition. The An-
nual Review of Psychology, 59: 6.1–6.24.
Fiedler, K. (1988). Emotional mood, cognitive style, and
behaviour regulation. In K. Fiedler & J. Forgas (eds.),
Affect, cognition, and social behaviour (pp.100–119).
Toronto: Hogrefe International.
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. London, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Hänze, M., & Hesse, F. W. (1993). Emotional influences
on semantic priming. Cognition and Emotion, 17, 83–
99.
Hogarth, R. M. (2005). Deciding analytically or trusting
your intuition? The advantages and disadvantages of
analytic and intuitive thought. In T. Betsch & S. Haber-
stroh (Eds.), The routines of decision-making (pp. 67–
82). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Isen, A. M. (1999). Positive affect. In T. Dalgleish & M.
Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp.
521–539). Sussex, UK: Wiley.
Isen, A. M., & Means, B. (1983). The influence of posi-
tive affect on decision-making strategy. Social Cogni-
tion, 2, 18–31.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and
choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psy-
chologist, 28, 697–720.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008 Affect in the Iowa gambling task 50
Lieberman, M. D. (2000). Intuition: A social cognitive
neuroscience approach. Psychological Bulletin, 126,
109–137.
Maia, T. V., & McClelland, J. L. (2004). A re-
examination of the evidence for the somatic marker
hypothesis: What participants really know in the Iowa
gambling task. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the USA, 101, 16075–16080.
Martin, L. L., & Clore, G. L. (Eds.). (2001). Theories
of mood and cognition: A user’s guidebook. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Murphy, S. T., & Zajonc, R. B. (1993). Affect, cogni-
tion, and awareness: Affective priming with optimal
and suboptimal stimulus exposures. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 64, 723–739.
Pfister, H. R., & Böhm, G. (2008). The multiplicity of
emotions: A framework of emotional functions in de-
cision making. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 5–
17.
Price, M. C., & Norman, E. (2008). Intuitive decisions
on the fringes of consciousness: Are they conscious
and does it matter? Judgment and Decision Making, 3,
28–41.
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1985). Content analy-
ses: Forced comparisons in the analysis of variance.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Ruder, M., & Bless, H. (2003). Mood and the reliance on
the ease of retrieval heuristic. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 85, 20–32.
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological
construction of emotion. Psychological Review, 110,
145–172.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1996). Feelings and phe-
nomenal experiences. In E. T. Higgins & A. Kruglan-
ski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic prin-
ciples (pp. 433–465). New York: Guilford.
Shiv, B., Loewenstein, G., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., &
Damasio, A. R. (2005). Investment behaviour and the
negative side of emotion. Psychological Science, 16,
435–439.
Strick, M., Holland, R.W., & van Knippenberg, A. (in
press). Seductive eyes: attractiveness and direct gaze
increase desire for associated objects. Cognition.
Wagar, B. M., & Dixon, M. (2006). Affective guidance
in the Iowa gambling task. Cognitive, Affective, & Be-
havioural Neuroscience, 6, 277–290.
Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discover-
ing the adaptive unconscious. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D.,
Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting
about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331–339.’
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences
need no inferences. American Psychologist, 35, 151–
175.
Zeelenberg, M., Nelissen, R. M. A., Breugelmans, S. M.,
& Pieters, R. (2008). On emotion specificity in deci-
sion making: Why feeling is for doing. Judgment and
Decision Making, 3, 18–27.
